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Abstract
A fast fashion system combines quick response production capabilities with enhanced product
design capabilities, to both design hotproducts that capture the latest consumer trends and
exploit minimal production leadtimes to match supply with uncertain demand. We develop
a model of such a system, and compare its performance to three alternative systems: quick
response-only systems, enhanced design-only systems, and traditional systems (which lack both
enhanced design and quick response capabilities). In particular, we focus on the impact of
each of the four systems on strategicor forward-looking customer purchasing behavior, i.e.,
the intentional delay in purchasing an item at the full price to obtain it during an end-of-
season clearance. We nd that enhanced design helps to mitigate strategic behavior by o¤ering
consumers a product they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a clearance
sale and possibly experiencing a stock-out. Quick response mitigates strategic behavior through
a di¤erent mechanism: by better matching supply to demand, it reduces the chance of a clearance
sale. Most importantly, we nd that while it is possible for quick response and enhanced design
to be either complements or substitutes, the complementarity e¤ect tends to dominate. Hence,
when both quick response and enhanced design are combined in a fast fashion system, the
rm typically enjoys a greater incremental increase in prot than the sum of the increases
resulting from employing either system in isolation, roughly by a factor of two in our numerical
experiments. Furthermore, complementarity is strongest when customers are very strategic.
We conclude that fast fashion systems can be of signicant value, particularly when consumers
exhibit strategic behavior.
1 Introduction
Firms in the fashion apparel industry such as Zara, H&M, and Benetton have increasingly em-
braced the philosophy of fast fashionretailing (Passariello 2008, Rohwedder and Johnson 2008).
Generally speaking, a fast fashion system combines at least two components:
1. Short production and distribution leadtimes, enabling a close matching of supply with uncer-
tain demand (which we refer to as quick response techniques).
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2. Highly fashionable (trendy) product design (which we refer to as enhanced design tech-
niques).
Short leadtimes are enabled through a combination of localized production, sophisticated in-
formation systems that facilitate frequent inventory monitoring and replenishment, and expedited
distribution methods. For example, Zara, primarily a European retailer, produces the majority
of its designs in costly European and North African factories (rather than outsourcing to less ex-
pensive Asian facilities), and continuously monitors inventory levels in stores to e¤ectively match
supply and demand (Ghemawat and Nueno 2003, Ferdows et al. 2004). The second component
(trendy product design) is made possible by carefully monitoring consumer and industry tastes
for unexpected fads and reducing design leadtimes. Benetton, for example, employs a network
of trend-spotters and designers throughout Europe and Asia, and also pays close attention to
seasonal fashion shows in Europe (Meichtry 2007).1
From an operational perspective, quick response strategies have been relatively well studied,
and are known to yield signicant value to rms by better matching supply and demand (see,
e.g., Fisher and Raman 1996, Eppen and Iyer 1997, Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz 2009, Caro
and Gallien 2009) and by inuencing consumer purchasing behavior by reducing the frequency
and severity of season-ending clearance sales (Cachon and Swinney 2009). However, the second
component of fast fashion systemscreating trendy, highly fashionable productshas received far
less attention. Indeed, despite the intense recent interest in leadtime reduction, Meichtry (2007)
describes how some rms are attempting to focus on design and develop trendier products without
reducing their production leadtimes, due to the di¢ culties (both logistical and cultural) that can
accompany drastically redesigning the supply network.
In this paper, we develop a framework that allows us to address the value of such enhanced
design strategies, and subsequently to consider the impact of combining both quick response and
enhanced design in a fast fashion system. We postulate that, all else being equal, enhanced
design capabilities result in products that are of greater value to consumers and hence elicit a
greater willingness-to-pay. Consequently, rms may exploit this greater willingness-to-pay by
charging higher prices on trendyproducts than on more conservative products. Enhanced design
1There are other aspects of fast fashion systems that we do not consider, notably frequent changes in product
assortment.
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capabilities are costly, however: there are typically xed costs (a large design sta¤, trend-spotters,
rapid prototyping capabilities, etc.) and there may be greater variable costs (e.g., because of more
labor-intensive production processes or costly local labor). Thus, as with any operational strategy,
rms considering enhanced design must trade o¤ the benets of the strategy (greater consumer
willingness-to-pay) with the costs (xed and variable).
A central issue that we address is the impact of enhanced design and quick response on consumer
purchasing behavior. Particularly in the fashion apparel industry, the propensity of consumers
to anticipate future markdowns and intentionally delay purchasing until a sale occurs is a well
documented and widespread problem (Rozhon 2004). This behavior erodes retailer margins and
can drastically reduce protability. Both enhanced design and quick response have frequently been
cited as an e¤ective tool for retailers to combat such strategic customer behavior (see, e.g.,
Ghemawat and Nueno 2003). Such systems, we demonstrate, decrease consumer incentives to wait
for clearance sales in key two ways. Quick response reduces the chance that inventory will remain
to be sold at the clearance price (because quick response more closely matches supply and demand
see Cachon and Swinney 2009). Enhanced product design, on the other hand, gives customers a
trendier product that they value more, making them less willing to risk waiting for a sale if there
is any chance that the item will stock out. Thus, while quick response decreases the expected
future utility of waiting for a price reduction, enhanced design increases the immediate utility of
buying the product at the full price. By decreasing consumer incentives to wait for the clearance
sale, both enhanced design and quick response allow the rm to set higher selling prices while still
inducing consumers to pay the full price.
Because the two techniques are increasingly used in combination in fast fashion systems, a
key question is how the two practices interact and inuence one anothers value; in particular,
we consider whether enhanced design and quick response are substitutes (i.e., implementing one
practice reduces the marginal worth of the other) or complements (i.e., implementing one practice
increases the marginal worth of the other, Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Whether quick response
and enhanced design are complements or substitutes has important consequences for the protabil-
ity of fast fashion systems versus alternative systems (e.g., a system with only quick response or
enhanced design, but not both), and moreover is critical to determine whether the e¤orts of rms
described by Meichtry (2007) to focus on implementing only one aspect of fast fashion are pru-
3
dent: as discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), complementary strategies should be adopted
simultaneously, whereas substitutable strategies are more likely to be adopted in isolation.
At rst glance, it may appear that the answer to the complementarity question is straightfor-
ward. Enhanced design results in more consumer value and higher selling prices, so eliminating
lost sales becomes more important to the rm with enhanced design (because in each lost sale, the
rm will lose out on a higher margin). This implies that adding quick response to an enhanced
design system may result in greater incremental value than implementing quick response alone,
leading to a complementarity e¤ect.
Our model conrms that this reasoning is correct and, in the absence of strategic consumer
behavior, results in quick response and enhanced design being complements. When customers
behave strategically, however, we also identify a second, more subtle, substitution e¤ect that arises
between quick response and enhanced design. This e¤ect is rooted in the fact that the two practices
independently inuence consumer purchasing behavior in a similar way. As discussed above, when
customers exhibit strategic behavior, both quick response and enhanced design generate value to
the rm by reducing consumers incentives to delay a purchase. Because both practices act via
similar mechanisms to mitigate strategic customer behavior, they behave can as substitutes along
this dimension. If, for instance, adopting quick response alone serves to heavily reduce (or even
eliminate) consumer incentives to wait for the clearance sale, then adding enhanced design on top
of quick response to form a fast fashion system may have little incremental impact on consumer
behavior and hence may reduce the marginal value of enhanced design practices.
As a result of this behavioral substitution e¤ect, quick response and enhanced design can be
either complements or substitutes. In the following analysis, we discuss conditions that dictate the
direction of this relationship. We nd that while substitution is possibleparticularly if enhanced
design is costly on a marginal basisunder most reasonable conditions the two practices are com-
plements. Thus, when employing both strategies in a fast fashion system, the rm typically enjoys
a superadditive increase in prot relative to employing the strategies in isolation. Furthermore,
via numerical experiments we show that the complementarity e¤ect is strongest if customers are
highly strategic. These results help to demonstrate that, while it may be tempting for rms to
only invest in one aspect of fast fashion (either quick response or enhanced design), there is less
value in doing so than in pursuing both strategies togetherpotentially far less value, if consumers
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are highly strategic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 reviews the relevant literature, while
§3 describes a basic model and analyzes a system with neither quick response nor enhanced design.
§§45 discuss the impact of employing quick response and enhanced design in isolation, and §§67
consider the combination of both components in a fast fashion system. §8 reports the results of
an extensive numerical study, and §9 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results.
2 Literature Review
There are two primary streams of research that relate to our analysis: the literature on operational
exibility with non-strategic customers (in particular, quick response and postponement practices)
and the literature on strategic consumer purchasing behavior. Quick response has received a large
amount of attentionsee, e.g., Fisher and Raman (1996), Eppen and Iyer (1997), Iyer and Bergen
(1997), Fisher et al. (2001), and the Sport Obermeyer case study by Hammond and Raman (1994).
Each of these works describes the benet of reducing supply-demand mismatches by providing the
rm with an option to procure inventory after learning updated demand information. More recent
works, such as Li and Ha (2008) and Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2009), address the impact of
competition on quick response inventory practices. Postponementthe practice of delaying nal
assemblyalso seeks to provide higher product availability with a lower inventory investment; see
Lee and Tang (1997), Feitzinger and Lee (1997), Goyal and Netessine (2007), and Anand and
Girotra (2007). The distinction between postponement and enhanced design is one of degree.
Postponement creates variants from a base model (e.g., di¤erent color panels for the same phone)
whereas enhanced design creates signicantly di¤erent product variants from component inventory
(e.g., a skirt or dress slacks from the same material). Neither the papers on quick response nor
postponement analytically address the impact of quick response or enhanced design on strategic
consumer behavior.
The issue of strategic (or rational) customer purchasing behavior dates to Coase (1972) and
the theory of durable goods pricing in monopolies. The Coase Conjecture, which was described
informally by Coase (1972) and formalized by Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982), states that in the
face of innitely patient consumers, a monopolist can charge a price no higher than marginal cost,
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as consumers will patiently wait as long as possible for the price to be reduced to its lowest level.
More recently, a stream of research has emerged that explores the role of supply and demand
mismatch in inuencing strategic consumer purchasing behavior. Liu and van Ryzin (2008) show
that a rm may wish to understock to generate shortages when prices decline over time and con-
sumers may strategically wait for the sale. Aviv and Pazgal (2008) examine the value of dynamic
and static pricing schemes in a revenue management setting with stochastically arriving strategic
customers. Yin et al. (2009) consider the impact of in-store display formats (e.g., displaying all
units or displaying one unit to limit consumer information about inventory availability) on the
consumer incentive to strategically delay purchasing. Su and Zhang (2008) show that when the
sale price is exogenously set, the rm reduces inventory and sets a lower full price in order to
induce strategic consumers to purchase at the full price. Other aspects of the strategic consumer
purchasing problem that have been addressed include: availability guarantees in Su and Zhang
(2009), product returns in Su (2009), and consumer stockpiling in Su (2007). While many of these
papers consider the inventory decision of the rm, none address the interaction of quick response,
enhanced design, or fast fashion systems with consumer purchasing.
Cachon and Swinney (2009) and Swinney (2009) do address the impact of quick response on
strategic consumer purchasing. Cachon and Swinney (2009) show that the presence of strategic
consumers can enhance the value of quick response beyond just matching supply with demand -
adopting quick response reduces the likelihood of deep discounts, which makes strategic consumers
more willing to purchase at the regular price. In Swinney (2009), the impact of quick response
in markets where consumers learn about product value over time is explored, and it is shown that
quick response may decrease or increase the rms prot, depending on characteristics of the selling
environment (e.g., whether consumer returns are allowed or whether the rm prices dynamically).
Unlike the present analysis, these papers do not address the impact of enhanced design on consumer
purchasing behavior nor the interaction between enhanced design and quick response to generate
a fast fashion retail system.
6
Normal Design Enhanced Design
Slow Production Traditional (T ) Enhanced Design (D)
Quick Response Quick Response (Q) Fast Fashion (F )
Table 1. The four possible production systems.
3 The Traditional System
To stimulate our analysis of the incremental value of the components of a fast fashion system,
we analyze a total of four potential operational systems. A traditional system, abbreviated T ,
represents a typical retailer with long production leadtimes and standard product design abilities.
As we will reveal below, this system most closely resembles a newsvendor model. A quick response
system, abbreviated Q, does not employ enhanced design capabilities, but does yield signicantly
reduced production leadtimes. An enhanced design system, abbreviated D, employs enhanced
design capabilities (and hence greater consumer willingness-to-pay) but maintains long production
leadtimesthis system resembles the e¤orts described by Meichtry (2007) to focus on product design
while avoiding the kind of radical supply chain overall necessary to achieve leadtime reduction.
Finally, a fast fashion system, abbreviated F , employs both quick response and enhanced design
capabilities. The fast fashion system resembles the mode of operations increasingly found in
retailers such as Zara, Benetton, and H&M. The characteristics of these systems are summarized
in Table 1.
One could argue that short production leadtimes should increase the e¢ cacy of creating trendy
products by allowing designs to be nalized closer to the selling season. For example, many tra-
ditional fashion retailers (such as Gap) have average design and production leadtimes on the order
of six to twelve months. If these rms intensied their product design e¤orts without reducing
production leadtimes, while they may be able to generate better products overall, they would still
have to make nal design decisions months in advance of the selling season (and consequently well
in advance of the revelation of any unexpected trends). On the other hand, a fast fashion rm
has dramatically shorter design-to-shelf leadtimes in some cases, on the order of weeks and so
such rms can observe and replicate trends practically in real time. Thus, enhanced design e¤orts
presumably result in an even greater increase in consumer willingness-to-pay if the rm simultane-
ously achieves leadtime reduction. We take a conservative approach on this issue: we assume that
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adopting enhanced design capabilities results in an identical increase in consumer willingness-to-pay
regardless of the production leadtime of the rm. In other words, we do not assume, ex ante, that
any complementarity exists between enhanced design e¤orts and quick response capabilitieswe
discuss the impact of this assumption in the conclusion of the paper.
In each possible system depicted in Table 1, we analyze a game between a rm and its consumers.
The rm chooses the selling price and the inventory level, while consumers choose whether to buy
at the full price or wait for a potential clearance sale (running the risk that the product might
run out). In this section, we introduce the basic model and analyze the case of the traditional
systemthat is, a system possessing neither quick response nor enhanced design. This model will
serve as a base case, upon which we will expand to analyze the three alternative systems.
3.1 The Model
A single rm sells a single product over a nite season. The market is characterized by demand
uncertainty: the total number of consumers in the market is stochastic and denoted by the contin-
uous random variable N with distribution F () and mean . Consumers have homogenous value
v for the product.
The product is sold over a single season. Prior to the start of the selling season (and prior to
learning market size), the rm makes an inventory procurement q at unit cost c, and sets a selling
price, p, to maximize expected prot, (q; p). At the end of the season, all remaining inventory is
cleared at an exogenous salvage or saleprice s, where s < c.2
Customers are strategic to the extent that they are forward-looking: they recognize that the
product will eventually be reduced in price and consider delaying their purchase until the price is
lowered. Customers discount future consumption at a rate  2 [0; 1]. By delaying a purchase until
the clearance sale, customers lose out on some consumptive value, and hence their future utility
is reduced to reect this loss. In addition,  may be thought of as the level of strategic behavior
or patience of the customer population (higher  implies more patient or strategic consumers)
or as a proxy for the durability of the good (higher  implies a more durable good with greater
2Su and Zhang (2008) also assume that the clearance price s is exogenous and common knowledge (e.g., it may
be the customary sale price in the industry or for the rm, or it may be the prevailing price of a secondary salvage
market that is accessible to consumers as well as the rm). An alternative model would allow the rm to dynamically
set a sale price at the end of the regular season; for a model with heterogeneous customers and dynamic sale pricing
coupled with quick response, see Cachon and Swinney (2009).
8
future value). For the remainder of the paper, we adopt the convention that greater  implies
a more strategic customer population,with the understanding that the factors inuencing this
may be related to the product itself, overall market or industry conditions, or intrinsic consumer
characteristics.
All consumers arrive at the rm at the start of the selling season. After observing the selling
price p, each consumer individually chooses to either purchase the product immediately at price p
or delay her purchase until the clearance sale. When making this decision, consumers take into
account their surplus from an immediate purchase (a function of valuation and price) and their
expected surplus from a delayed purchase, which incorporates the clearance price s, the discount
factor , and the perceived probability of obtaining a unit, which we label . One of two cases
then occurs for each individual consumer. If the rm is out-of-stock at the full price, the game is
over. If the rm is in-stock, then the consumer chooses between purchasing at the full price and
obtaining the unit for certain, and delaying until the clearance sale and probabilistically obtaining
a unit. The surplus of an immediate purchase at price p is v   p, while the expected surplus of a
delayed purchase at the clearance price3 is  (v   s). Consumers subsequently choose to purchase
at the price that yields greater expected surplus, and we assume that if consumers are indi¤erent
between the two actions, then they purchase at the full price p.4 The sequence of events is depicted
in Figure 1.
Strategic consumers who choose to delay their purchase are rst in line in the clearance
marketthat is, while the rm may dispose of an innite amount of inventory on the salvage market
(implying innite demand), strategic customers are allocated remaining inventory rst, followed by
demand from the salvage market.5 In what follows, we use the superscript  to denote equilibrium
3An alternative model would be consumers who do not discount future consumption, but rather have declining
valuations. In that case, the expected surplus of a delayed purchase at the clearance price is v  s; see, e.g., Cachon
and Swinney (2009). This alternative model results in slightly higher full prices (because consumers consider the
full future cost, s, rather than a discounted future cost, s) but qualitatively similar results to our own.
4 In particular, if consumers are indi¤erent between purchasing opportunities, they do not consider randomizing
between the two periods; in other words, we do not consider mixed strategies. The reason for this is simple: because
our consumers are homogenous, if mixed strategies are allowed and some consumers (randomly) choose to wait for
the sale, the rm can simply lower the full price by an arbitrarily small amount to eliminate consumer indi¤erence
and induce all consumers to pay the full price. The amount of discounting necessary to achieve this is arbitrarily
small and is hence ignored.
5This allocation rule is also adopted by Su and Zhang (2008). A more general allocation mechanism in the salvage
stagee.g., random arrivals of strategic customers and customers from the exogeneous salvage market, discussed in
Cachon and Swinney (2009)merely reduces the probability that a consumer receives a unit at the salvage price and
is unlikely to qualitatively change the results.
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Before the Selling Season Selling Season
Firm:
Design finalized
and inventory
level chosen.
Firm:
Selling price
(p) chosen.
Firm:
Remaining
inventory marked
down to s.
Consumers:
Arrive and choose to
purchase now or
wait for the sale.
Figure 1. Sequence of events in the traditional system.
values (prices, quantities, prots), and the subscripts T; Q; D; and F to denote specic systems
where necessary.
Finally, we note here that we do not consider any xed costs resulting from the implementation
of any system (though we will account for increases in variable costs resulting from quick response
or enhanced design). Indeed, xed costs can be signicant, particularly in the form of physical in-
frastructure (factory, warehouse, and distribution systems) and information systems. Directionally,
the impact of such xed costs is clear.
3.2 Equilibrium Inventory and Pricing
To explore the value of the traditional system (and each of the subsequent systems), we analyze
a game between the forward-looking customer population and the rm: consumers choose when
to buy the product (at the full price or at the discounted price) and the rm chooses how much
inventory to stock and what price to charge. We assume that consumers do not directly observe
the total inventory of the rm before making their decisions,6 and consequently the rm cannot
credibly convey inventory information to consumers (i.e., the rm is not a leader in a sequential
game). Consumers do, however, make their purchasing decisions with a xed belief about the
probability of a clearance sale () which is correct in equilibriumin other words, consumers have
rational expectations concerning the average probability of a clearance sale.
We thus seek Nash equilibria in a simultaneous decision game between many players: the rm
6Consumers may be incapable of directly observing inventory in a variety of situations, including: if the rm is
an online retailer; if the rm stocks a particular retail location from a centralized warehouse; or if the rm displays
a limited amount of inventory on the store oor.
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and a continuum of (identical) consumers. Given that consumers are homogeneous, either all
consumers purchase at price p or all consumers purchase at price s. However, the latter does not
lead to an interesting equilibrium: given s < c, the rm does not order any inventory. Thus, we
are left to derive an equilibrium in which all consumers purchase early. In such an equilibrium,
the rms expected prot as a function of the price p and quantity q is
T (q; p) = E ((p  s)S(q)  (c  s) q) ;
where S(q) = Emin(q;N) is expected sales given a quantity x and the expectation operator E
is taken over market size, N . Given these preliminaries, we may now dene the equilibrium to
pricing-inventory-purchasing game:
Denition 1 An equilibrium with rational expectations to the game between strategic consumers
and the rm satises:
1. The rm sets price and inventory to maximize expected prot, given that consumers all pur-
chase early: (q; p) = arg maxq;p (q; p).
2. Consumers purchase early, given the selling price p and a belief about the probability of a
clearance sale, : v   p   (v   s).
3. Consumer beliefs are rational:  = F (q).
Our model of the traditional system is similar to the model analyzed by Su and Zhang (2008),
but our consumers discount future consumption by an arbitrary amount. This di¤erence results in
slightly more complicated expressions for equilibrium price and inventory levels, but nevertheless
the equilibrium analysis is qualitatively similar to our own. Dene
A (v) = v (1  ) + (1 + ) s and B (v; c) = sv   c (v   s) :
We may now solve for the equilibrium in the traditional system:
Lemma 1 In a traditional system, an equilibrium with non-zero production exists and is unique.
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In equilibrium, all consumers purchase early. The equilibrium full price is
pT =
A (v) +
q
A (v)2   4B (v; c)
2
:
Proof. All proofs appear in the appendix.
It is clear that the equilibrium price pT is decreasing in the consumer discount factor (), hence
the greater the severity of strategic customer behavior (i.e., the less consumers discount future
consumption and the greater ), the lower the rm must set the selling price to induce consumers
to purchase at the full price.
4 Quick Response
In the quick response system, the design abilities are standard while the production phase is fast
hence, while the product design process results in lower value products for consumers, the inventory
may be procured after learning total market size. To model quick response, we adopt a stylized
model employed by much of the literature; see, e.g., Cachon and Swinney (2009), Fisher and Raman
(1996), and Eppen and Iyer (1997). Following this literature, we assume that the rm can procure
inventory both before and after receiving a forecast update prior to the start of the selling season.
The forecast update is perfectly informative (i.e., reveals the actual demand level) and production
is fast enough that all units arrive before the start of the selling season. Inventory procured prior
to learning demand information is obtained for a low cost (c, just as in the traditional system in the
preceding section), while additional inventory procured after learning the realized value of market
size incurs an additional cost cQ  0 due to expedited manufacturing and shipping expenses. The
sequence of events is depicted in Figure 2.
When making the inventory procurement following the realization of demand information, it is
easy to see that as long as the margin on each unit (p c cQ) is positive, the optimal action of the
rm is to produce precisely enough inventory to cover all full price demand. Equilibrium in the
quick response system is dened using the same three conditions in Denition 1, and the following
lemma solves for this equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In a quick response system, an equilibrium with non-zero production exists and is unique.
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Updated demand
information
revealed to firm.
Before the Selling Season Selling Season
Firm:
Design finalized and
initial inventory level
chosen.
Firm:
Selling price
(p) chosen.
Firm:
Remaining
inventory marked
down to s.
Consumers:
Arrive and choose
to purchase now or
wait for the sale.
Firm:
Additional inventory
procurement
allowed.
Figure 2. Sequence of events in the quick response system.
In equilibrium, all consumers purchase early. The equilibrium full price is
pQ = v   
cQ
c+ cQ   s (v   s) ; (1)
if pQ  c+ cQ, while if pQ < c+ cQ, the equilibrium is identical to the traditional system.
Due to the option to procure additional inventory at a later date, the rm procures less inventory
in the initial buy than in the traditional system, which results in a lower chance that there will be
inventory available during the clearance season. Consequently, from a consumers point of view,
the probability of successfully obtaining a unit at the sale price decreases, along with the incentive
to wait for the discounted price. In turn, this allows the rm to charge a higher full price while
maintaining an equilibrium in which (as we saw in the traditional system) all consumers attempt
to purchase at the full price, provided the extra cost of quick response (cQ) is not too high, as the
following lemma summarizes:
Lemma 3 The equilibrium price is greater in the quick response system than in the traditional
system (pQ > p

T ) if and only if p

T > c+ cQ.
In sum, quick response provides value to the rm via two distinct e¤ects:
1. The sales e¤ect : quick response eliminates lost sales by allowing the rm a second procure-
ment opportunity after observing demand.
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2. The behavioral e¤ect : as Lemma 3 demonstrates, when the cost of quick response is not too
high, value is also added by reducing consumer incentives to wait for the sale and subsequently
increasing the equilibrium selling price.7
One may think of the sales e¤ect as the operational consequence of quick response (well studied
in the literature, e.g., by Fisher and Raman 1996) while the latter e¤ect is purely a consequence
of strategic customer behavior. The fact that quick response generates value via two independent
mechanisms is critical when we discuss the value of fast fashion in §7.
5 Enhanced Design
In the enhanced design system, the production leadtimes are long but the rm invests in improved
design e¤orts that result in greater value to consumers. Thus, we assume that enhanced design
results in a marginal increase of m  0 to consumer value, that is, consumers possess valuations
equal to v+m for products resulting from enhanced design e¤orts.8 However, when operating with
enhanced design capabilities, every unit produced incurs an additional cost cD  0. To facilitate
our analysis, the clearance price s is assumed to be identical to the clearance price in the traditional
and quick response systems.9 The sequence of events is identical to that depicted in Figure 1.
Due to the similarity in the sequence of events, the analysis of the enhanced design system is
comparable to that of the traditional system. Thus, the following lemma follows immediately from
Lemma 1.
Lemma 4 In a enhanced design system, an equilibrium with non-zero production exists and is
unique. In equilibrium, all consumers purchase early. The equilibrium full price is
pD =
A (v +m) +
q
A (v +m)2   4B (v +m; c+ cD)
2
:
7 In Cachon and Swinney (2009), quick response provides value by inuencing the rms dynamic sale pricing
decisions during the selling season; here, the sale price is exogenously xed, and quick response provides value by
inuencing the rms initial pricing decision at the start of the season.
8 In our model, enhanced design results in greater consumer value, which the rm then exploits to raise the
selling price. An alternative model might assume that the selling price is xed (possibly for competitive reasons),
but enhanced design results in a more popular product and hence greater market share or size. Such a model,
particularly one incorporating competition, may prove to be a fruitful direction for future research.
9One might (justiably) argue that the clearance price should be higher in a system with enhanced design. This
turns out to signicantly complicate the analytical price and prot comparisons in our model; hence, we numerically
investigate this possibility in §8.3.
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Note that pD is increasing in m and cD while the behavior of p

D as a function of the other
parameters is identical to the behavior of pT . Hence, because the traditional system is equivalent
to the enhanced design system with m = cD = 0, it follows that pD > p

T , which we formally state
in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 The equilibrium price is greater in the enhanced design system than in the traditional
system (pD > p

T ).
Although the price is higher with the enhanced design system, the equilibrium consumer action
remains the same as the traditional system: all customers purchase at the full price rather than
wait for the sale. Thus, the rm can exploit enhanced design capabilities to raise prices without
increasing strategic waiting, which is clearly benecial to the rm if the increase in costs (cD) is
not too high. A necessary condition for enhanced design to be protable is pT < p

D   cD, which
implies that the margin on each sale increases as a result of enhanced design. Note that this is
not a su¢ cient condition for the protability of enhanced design, as an increase in production costs
also implies an increase in costs due to excess inventory.
The preceding lemmas demonstrate that enhanced design, much like quick response, inuences
rm prot via two distinct e¤ects:
1. The valuation e¤ect: adding m to valuations raises the utility that customers earn from
the product whether they buy it at the full price or the clearance price; however, since 
and  are both less than one, utility from early purchasing is raised more than utility from
late consumption (m > m), allowing the rm to raise the full price and still induce early
purchasing.
2. The behavioral e¤ect : by changing consumer valuations and the production cost, the rm al-
ters costs of holding too much and too little inventory, in turn changing the optimal inventory
level and hence the probability of a clearance sale. Because optimal inventory may increase
or decrease relative to the traditional system, consumers may have more or less incentive to
strategically wait for the sale, and the behavioral e¤ect may have negative or positive value
to the rm.
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Just as in the quick response case, the rst mechanism (the valuation e¤ect) exists even if
customers are completely non-strategic; the latter e¤ect, on the other hand, only exists if customers
exhibit strategic behavior. Unlike the quick response case, both of these e¤ects impact prot by
a¤ecting the equilibrium selling price.
6 Fast Fashion
The fast fashion system combines operating characteristics of the quick response and enhanced
design systems. As a result, the rm is capable of both raising consumer values for the product
and reducing supply-demand mismatch. The sequence of events in the fast fashion system is the
same as that depicted in Figure 2. As in the enhanced design model, consumers earn an extra
value of m per unit, and every unit incurs an additional cost of cD  0. As in the quick response
system, the rm has the option of obtaining additional inventory close to the selling season after
receiving perfect demand information, at an additional cost of cQ  0 per unit. Thus, the rm
possesses a comparable cost structure to the alternative systems.
Because the sequence of events is similar in the quick response and the fast fashion systems, the
equilibrium follows immediately from Lemma 2 by setting consumer valuations equal to v+m and
increasing the production cost on every unit (procured both before and after the forecast update)
by cD.
Lemma 6 In a fast fashion system, an equilibrium with non-zero production exists and is unique.
In equilibrium, all consumers purchase early. The equilibrium full price is
pF = v +m  
cQ
c+ cD + cQ   s (v +m  s) :
Using Lemma 6, we derive the following result:
Lemma 7 The equilibrium price is greater in the fast fashion system than in all of the other
systems (pF > max

pD; p

Q; p

T

) if pD > c+ cD + cQ.
In other words, the rm can leverage a fast fashion system to raise the equilibrium selling price
in multiple ways via the mechanisms generated by the component strategies of fast fashion: quick
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response allows the rm to raise the price via the behavioral e¤ect, while enhanced design allows the
rm to alter the selling price via both the valuation and behavioral price e¤ects. The combination
of these e¤ects results in a fast fashion system yielding the greatest equilibrium price (provided, as
in the quick response system, costs are not too high so as to make the second inventory procurement
option unprotable).
Although Lemma 7 demonstrates that fast fashion results in higher equilibrium selling prices,
this does not necessarily imply that a fast fashion rm (such as Zara) will have greater prices than
a rm using traditional production. Indeed, Zara famously has lower initial selling prices than
many of its rivals. This apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that our analysis compares prices
for di¤erent production systems holding all else equal ; in particular, baseline product quality.
In addition to being famous for low prices and fast fashion production, Zara is also known to
use cheaper materials, resulting in less durable, lower quality products (designed to be worn 10
times, as Ghemawat and Nueno 2003 note). Hence, for Zara, v (base consumer value) and c
(base production cost) are both likely to be lower than at a higher quality competitor, such as a
traditional department store, resulting in lower prices at Zara despite the implementation of fast
fashion production.
7 The Interaction of Enhanced Design and Quick Response
In this section, we analyze the impact of combining enhanced design and quick response in a fast
fashion system. Specically, we seek to answer the following question: are enhanced design and
quick response complements, or substitutes? If they are complements, then investing in a fast
fashion system results in a superadditive benet: the incremental value of a fast fashion system
(the change in prot over a traditional system) is more than the combined incremental value of
enhanced design and quick response employed in isolation, i.e.,
(F   T ) >
 
Q   T

+ (D   T ) :
Simplifying this expression, quick response and enhanced design are complements if and only if
F   Q > D   T .
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Figure 3. The key interactions between quick response and enhanced design.
Our rst result is that, in general, it is possible for quick response and enhanced design to be
either complements or substitutes. To explain this nding, recall that quick response impacts prot
via a sales e¤ect (eliminating lost sales) and a behavioral e¤ect (inuencing consumer purchasing
behavior, allowing for a greater selling price). Enhanced design impacts prot via a valuation
e¤ect (adding m to consumer valuations) and a behavioral e¤ect (altering consumer incentives
to strategically wait for the sale). There are two key interactions at work: the interaction of
the sales e¤ect of quick response and the valuation e¤ect of enhanced design, which we call the
operational interaction; and the interaction of the behavioral e¤ects of both practices, which we
call the behavioral interaction. These terms derive from the fact that the operational interaction
exists for any  (including  = 0, though we emphasize that the interaction is not independent of
), whereas the behavioral interaction only exists if  > 0, i.e., if consumers are strategic. The
interactions are summarized in Figure 3.10
As shown in Figure 3, the key to our initial result lies in the fact that while the operational
interaction is unambiguously complementary, along the behavioral dimension quick response and
enhanced design may be either complements or substitutes. The net e¤ect is the sum of the
operational and behavioral interactions, hence when the behavioral substitution e¤ect is su¢ ciently
strong, quick response and enhanced design may, overall, be substitutes.
10We have focused on the two most salient e¤ects which lead to complementarity or substitution. However, there
are other interactions involved in a fast fashion system beyond these two: for instance, the behavioral e¤ect of quick
response interacts with the valuation e¤ect of enhanced design. Moreover, increased marginal cost in the enhanced
design system also impacts supply-demand mismatch costs, though as these e¤ects are more standard we have focused
on the behavioral consequences of enhanced design.
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To discuss this result, we will analyze each interaction separately, beginning with the opera-
tional interaction. As stated above, quick response and enhanced design are always operational
complements. This is because increasing consumer valuations and thus the selling price (adopting
enhanced design) is more valuable to the rm if sales are higher (i.e., if the rm also employs quick
response) and the marginal increase in price is earned on more units. To illustrate this point,
consider the case when  = 0, s = 0, and cQ = cD = 0. Imposing  = 0 eliminates the behavioral
e¤ects from Figure 3, meaning only the operational interaction remains. From the preceding lem-
mas, the optimal selling prices are pT = p

Q = v and p

D = p

F = v + m. The incremental change
in expected prot from enhanced design is
D   T = (v +m)S (qD)  cqD   vS (qT ) + cqT
 (v +m)S (qD)  cqD   vS (qD) + cqD
= mS (qD)  m = F   Q:
The inequality follows from the fact that, in the traditional system, prot evaluated at quantity
qD is less than prot evaluated at quantity q

T , by denition of the optimal quantity q

T . As the
example shows, with fast fashion, the additional margin from enhanced design is enjoyed on the
mean demand, while with enhanced design (and no quick response abilities) the additional margin
is only enjoyed on the expected sales (mean demand minus lost sales), which are by denition less
than the mean demand. Consequently, enhanced designs valuation e¤ect is more benecial if the
rm also possesses quick response, leading to a complementary relationship.
If the operational interaction were the only interaction between quick response and enhanced
design, then the two practices would always be complements, and indeed this is the case if  = 0 (i.e.,
if consumers are non-strategic). However, when  > 0, the behavioral e¤ects of these strategies
come into play, potentially leading to substitution. To understand this behavioral interaction,
it is useful to consider two specic examples, one in which quick response and enhanced design
are complements along the behavioral dimension and one in which they are substitutes. In both
examples, demand is normally distributed with  = 150 and  = 75, and  = 0:9, v = 8, c = 2,
s = 1:9, cQ = 0, and m = 1.
Example 1: Behavioral Complementarity. In the rst example, cD = 0. In the traditional
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and enhanced design systems, equilibrium prices are pT = 3:44 and p

D = 3:65. Expected prots
in these systems are T = 201 and 

D = 232, and the incremental value of enhanced design is
D   T = 31. In the quick response and fast fashion systems, equilibrium prices are pQ = 8
and pF = 9 (costless quick response means the rm produces all inventory after learning demand,
allowing the rm to eliminate clearance sales and extract all consumer surplus), with expected
prots equal to Q = (p

Q   c) = 900 and F = (pF   c  cD) = 1050. The incremental value of
a fast fashion system over a quick response system is F  Q = 150, and so in this example, quick
response and enhanced design are complements.
The reason for this is that, in addition to the operational complementarities, quick response
and enhanced design are complements along the behavioral dimension as well. This can be seen
in the increase in the equilibrium price resulting from enhanced design. Adding enhanced design
to a traditional system only results in a price increase of pD   pT = 0:21, while adding enhanced
design to quick response to form a fast fashion system yields a price increase of pF  pQ = 1. Thus,
in this example, enhanced design results in a larger increase in the equilibrium price when used in
conjunction with quick response.
Example 2: Behavioral Substitution. In the second example, cD = m = 1. In the
traditional and enhanced design systems, equilibrium prices are pT = 3:44 and p

D = 5:21. Expected
prots are T = 201 and 

D = 241, hence the incremental value of enhanced design is 

D T = 41.
In the quick response and fast fashion systems, equilibrium prices remain pQ = 8 and p

F = 9, but
expected prots are equal to Q = (p

Q   c) = 900 and F = (pF   c   cD) = 900. The
incremental value of fast fashion over quick response is thus F   Q = 0, clearly less than the
value of enhanced design in isolation; hence, quick response and enhanced design are substitutes.
Observe that in this example pD  pT = 1:77 > 1 = pF   pQ. That is, enhanced design results in a
larger increase in the equilibrium price when used in isolation than when used in conjunction with
quick response. This is the driving force behind the substitution e¤ect.
The key to both of these examples, and to the behavioral interaction, lies in the way that
enhanced design impacts equilibrium inventory. Recall that in all four systems, all consumers
attempt to purchase at the full pricehence, the only di¤erences in inventory derive from di¤erences
in the costs of ordering too little and too much inventory in the initial procurement. Table ??
summarizes these costs, in addition to the newsvendor critical ratio, for each of the four systems.
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T D Q F
Underage Cost pT   c pD   c  cD cQ cQ
Overage Cost c  s c+ cD   s c  s c+ cD   s
Critical Ratio p

T c
pT s
pD c cD
pD s
cQ
c+cQ s
cQ
c+cQ+cD s
Table 2. Equilibrium overage costs, underage costs, and critical ratios.
The behavioral e¤ect of quick response derives from the change in underage costs, while the
behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design derives from the change in overage and underage costs. In
both cases, changes in costs change the inventory level of the rm and consumer incentives to delay
purchasing. If adopting enhanced design increases the critical ratio, then consumers are given a
greater incentive to delay purchasing, meaning the rm must lower the selling price somewhat to
induce early purchases; in this case, the behavioral e¤ect reduces rm prot. If adopting enhanced
design decreases the critical ratio, then consumers have lower incentives to delay purchasing as a
result of enhanced design, and hence the behavioral e¤ect increases rm prot.
From Table ??, the critical ratio in the fast fashion system is lower than in the quick response
system; hence, enhanced designs behavioral e¤ect always increases rm prot if used in conjunction
with quick response. On the other hand, the critical ratio in the enhanced design system may
be smaller or larger than the critical ratio in the traditional system; consequently, when used in
isolation, the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design may have positive of negative value to the rm.
In Example 1, quick response and enhanced design are complements because, since cD = 0, from
Lemma 5 (which shows pD > p

T ), underage costs are higher in the enhanced design system than in
the traditional system, while overage costs are the same, meaning the critical ratio is higher with
enhanced design than without. The behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design thus has negative value
to the rm. The behavioral e¤ect of quick resposne completely eliminates consumer incentives to
wait for the sale in both the Q and F system (since cQ = 0), which implies that employing quick
response at the same time takes a negative e¤ect and eliminates it, leading to complementarity.
In Example 2, since cD = 1, the critical ratio is lower with enhanced design than in the
traditional system. Consequently, the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design has positive value to
the rm. Once again, because cQ = 0, the behavioral e¤ect of quick response eliminates the
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behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design, so there is no behavioral benet to adding enhanced design
to quick response system. Thus, quick response takes a positive e¤ect of enhanced design and
eliminates it, leading to a substitution e¤ect.
Generally speaking, the behavioral e¤ect of quick response reduces the impact of the behavioral
e¤ect of enhanced design. The key to the net interaction of the two practiceswhether they are
complements or substituteslies in whether the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design has positive
or negative value to the rm, which naturally depends on specic parameter values. We may,
however, make a denitive statement about the interaction of enhanced design and quick response
when cD = 0:
Theorem 1 If cD = 0 and cQ < s+
p
(v +m  s) (c  s)  c, enhanced design and quick response
are complements.
The second condition in Theorem 1 ensures that quick response is not so costly that it is
unprotablethe condition guarantees that units procured using quick response have a positive
margin, otherwise the rm would not employ quick response. As a result, this is not a particularly
restrictive condition. The rst condition (cD = 0) is more substantive, ensuring that enhanced
design results in no additional marginal production cost, which, in accordance with Example 1
above, implies that enhanced designs behavioral e¤ect is detrimental to the rm.
Based on this discussion, as one might expect, for small cD the behavioral e¤ects of quick
response and enhanced design are complements (because the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design
has negative value) while for large cD they are substitutes (because the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced
design has positive value, and the behavioral e¤ect of quick response reduces the impact of this
e¤ect). We have observed that this is indeed the case, and moreover the substitution e¤ect typically
grows stronger as cD increases, a feature that is graphically depicted in Figure 4 for the same
parameter combination used in the preceding examples.
While we do not analytically prove the behavior depicted in the gure, we have observed that
substitution occurs above some threshold cD in all numerical cases we have examined, and it can
be shown for the special case of cQ = 0 and  = 1 that this occurs (proof omitted).
To summarize, the behavioral e¤ects of the two strategies both serve to independently inuence
consumer purchasing incentives, and the behavioral e¤ect of quick response always reduces the
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Figure 4. The incremental value of fast fashion over quick response (F   Q) and the incremental value
of enhanced design over the traditional system (D   T ), plotted as a function of the cost of enhanced
design, cD.
impact of the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design. Whether quick response and enhanced design
are complements or substitutes hinges on whether this is benecial to the rm. If the behavioral
e¤ect of enhanced design results in a decrease in rm prot (which happens if cD is small), then
the moderating presence of quick responses behavioral e¤ect leads to complementarity. If, on
the other hand, the behavioral e¤ect of enhanced design leads to an increase in rm prot (which
happens if cD is large), then quick responses behavioral e¤ect reduces the incremental impact of
enhanced design along the behavioral dimension. If this substitution e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, it
can overwhelm the complementary interaction along the operational dimension and lead to a net
substitution e¤ect.
This discussion may lead one to conclude that quick response and enhanced design are more
likely to be substitutes as consumers become more strategic (i.e., as  grows large). This need not
be the case, however. The reason is that it is not obvious how a more strategic customer population
impacts the complementarity of the practices along the operational dimension. Recall that while
this interaction exists even if  = 0, it is not independent of . The complicated way that quick
response and enhanced design interact with one another, and the question of how  impact the
net interaction, motivates the numerical study in the following section.
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8 Numerical Study
The preceding analysis leads to several interesting questions. First: when the conditions Theorem
1 are violated (specically the cD = 0 condition), how pervasive is the complementarity result?
Second: what is the magnitude of the complementarity e¤ect? Third: how is the complementarity
e¤ect impacted by changes in the various parameter values (in particular, , the consumer discount
factor)? And fourth: under what conditions are the various production systems most valuable?
Because the equilibrium expressions for prices, inventory levels, and prots are complex and di¢ cult
to decipher analytically, we employ an extensive numerical study in §§8.18.2 to answer these
questions. Lastly, §8.3 presents a numerical analysis of an extension to our base mode: design-
dependent clearance prices.
8.1 The Value of Fast Fashion
The study consists of 8,019 total instances resulting from every possible combination of the values
listed in Table 3. These parameters represent a wide range of plausible values, chosen to represent
realistic scenarios from the fashion apparel industry. The coe¢ cient of variation of demand (=)
equals 0.5, 0.75, or 1 (Hammond and Raman 1994 report similar values, e.g., less than one, in the
context of skiwear). Maximum gross margins (i.e., (v   c)=v in the standard design systems and
(v + m   c   cD)=(v + m) in the enhanced design systems) range from 33% to 83% (actual gross
margins depend on the equilibrium selling price and can even be negative in unprotableenhanced
design systems). These gures are in-line with the reported gross margins from the annual lings
of many fashion apparel rms.11 Enhanced design and quick response each incur 10% to 50% cost
premiums (thus, fast fashion incurs 20% to 100% cost premiums), and hotproducts generated
with enhanced design generate between 10% and 30% more consumer value than safe products
created without enhanced design. While these parameters are naturally more di¢ cult to match to
industry data, we believe they are plausible given the costs of local production versus outsourced
production and transportation (e.g., a fast fashion designed product can be anywhere from 20% to
100% more expensive than a traditional product).
Note that the entire sample consists of instances with cD > 0, meaning the entire numerical
11A search on Google Finance for fashion retailer gross margins in annual reports shows ranges in the interval 38%,
for Nordstrom, to 70-80%, for leather-goods makers like Coach and Piquadro.
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Parameter Values
Demand Distribution Normal
 150
 f75; 112:5; 150g
v 8
m f1; 2; 3g
c f2; 3; 4g
cD f0:1c; 0:3c; 0:5cg
cQ f0:1c; 0:3c; 0:5cg
s f0:75c; 0:85c; 0:95cg
 f0; 0:1; 0:2; :::; 1g
Table 3. Parameter values used in numerical experiments.
analysis lies outside the scope of Theorem 1. For each parameter combination, we calculated
the equilibrium under all four systems and determined expected prices and prots. Even though
the su¢ cient conditions for complementarity from Theorem 1 were not satised by any parameter
combination, the complementarity result held virtually always: in 7,969 cases (99.4% of the sample),
we observed that the value of a fast fashion system (the increase in prot over the traditional system)
was weakly greater than the combined value of quick response and enhanced design operating
alone.12 Furthermore, the fast fashion system was optimal (provided the greatest expected prot)
in 6,985 cases (87.1%).
We rst consider the magnitude of the complementarity e¤ect. In particular, we analyze the
complementarity e¤ect as a function of the consumer discount factor (). Figure 5 plots the
percentage increase in rm prot (relative to the base case of the traditional system) from each of
the three alternative strategies, averaged over our entire sample. Included in the graph is a plot of
the sum of the values of quick response and enhanced design, expressed as a percentage increase in
rm prot; if the value of fast fashion lies above this sum, then the complementarity e¤ect exists.
As the gure demonstrates, when  is small (consumers are not very strategic), the complementarity
e¤ect is also small; when  is large (consumers are very strategic) the complementarity e¤ect is
dramatic, with fast fashion adding about twice as much prot as the combined values of enhanced
design and production. Hence, the magnitude of complementarity appears to increase as consumers
12 In the 50 cases in which enhanced design and rapid production were not complementary, we observed that
enhanced design provided strongly negative value on its own (because the cost of enhanced design was too high to
justify the relatively small price increase), as one might expect from the discussion in §7. However, 2,898 cases
yielded negative value for enhanced design, but nevertheless the complementarity result held in 2,848 of these.
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Figure 5. The percentage increase in expected prot (over the traditional system) in each system as a
function of the consumer discount factor (), averaged over the entire sample.
become more strategic, implying that fast fashion systems are most valuable when consumers are
very strategic.13
We stress, however, that it isnt always the case that complementarity increases as  increases:
the ratio between the value of fast fashion and the sum of the values of enhanced design and quick
response as a function of  is not monotonic. On average, though, if  is zero (consumers are
myopic), then fast fashion is roughly 1.98 times as valuable as the sum of the independent systems;
when consumers are perfectly strategic ( = 1), it is more than 2.3 times as valuable as the sum of
the independent strategies. Thus, despite the fact that substitution is only possible via interaction
along the behavioral dimension, generally speaking the complementarity is strongest if customers
are very strategic. This is a consequence of the fact the behavioral e¤ects of quick response and
enhanced design are complementary if cD is su¢ ciently small (and, in our sample, this occurs in
most instances), and this complementarity e¤ect strengthens as behavioral factors become more
important to the system (i.e., as  grows large). We conclude from this observation that quick
response and enhanced design experience the strongest complementarity when  is large (customers
are very strategic) and the variable costs of enhanced design are not too large.
13 Indeed, it is possible to nd parameter combinations for which expected prot is zero in the traditional production
system, and positive in one or more of the alternative systems. Thus, it is possible for the systems to possess innite
value, in relative terms, though we designed the numerical study to avoid these cases to facilitate analysis of the
percentage prot increase resulting from the three alternative strategies.
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Figure 6. Examples of the value of the alternative product strategies (incremental increase in prot over
the traditional system) as a function of three parameters.
8.2 When is Fast Fashion Most Valuable?
The preceding discussion focused on when the complementarity e¤ect holds, but understanding the
conditions that dictate optimality of the various production systems can help guide managers on
when to invest in fast fashion capabilities. Thus, in this section, we discuss the following more
specic question: when is a fast fashion system most valuable? To address this question, we have
chosen to examine a few representative numerical examples, rather than using a broad, large-scale
study as in the previous subsection. The results of these examples are depicted graphically in Figure
6. Each subgure plots the value of an alternative production strategy (i.e., in the incremental
increase in prot over the traditional system) as a function of a di¤erent problem parameter.
Figure 6a plots the value of the three strategies as a function of s, the clearance price. In the
example, demand is normally distributed with  = 150 and  = 75, and the remaining parameters
are: v = 10, m = 3, c = 4, cD = 1, cQ = 2, and  = 1. Observe rst that the values of quick
response (squares) and fast fashion (triangles) are both decreasing in s; this is natural, since it
becomes less important to reduce overage costs by adopting rapid production capabilities as the
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clearance or salvage cost increases. Interestingly, the value of enhanced design (diamonds) is
increasing in s. This is because of behavioral e¤ects: the greater the clearance price, the less
incentive consumers have to wait for the sale, and hence the rm can extract a greater fraction of
the value increase (m) when adopting enhanced design. Thus, for small s, quick response may be
preferred to enhanced design, but for large s this relationship can be reversed.14 We note that
given our model assumptions, fast fashion always yields a prot at least as great as the prot in
an enhanced design system, so it is impossible for enhanced design to be preferred to fast fashion;
nevertheless, the gap between the two decreases as the clearance price increases. Consequently,
fast fashion is of greatest incremental value when clearance prices are expected to be low.
Figure 6b plots the value of each strategy as a function of the standard deviation of demand, .
In the example, demand is normally distributed with  = 150, and the remaining parameters are:
v = 10, m = 2, c = 4, cD = 2:6, cQ = 1, s = 2 and  = 1. As one would expect, the two strategies
employing rapid production capabilities are most valuable when demand is highly variable. The
value of enhanced design, however, is decreasing15 in . This is because enhanced design is
accompanied by potentially greater production costs; combining these greater production costs
with greater demand variability leads to greater inventory overage costs, and hence a decreasing
value e¤ect. Note that this e¤ect is also present for fast fashion; as a result, the value of fast fashion
increases slower as a function of  than the value of quick response, and it can be the case that
fast fashion is optimal for low  while quick response is optimal for very high . Enhanced design
must be very costly for this to be a signicant e¤ect, howeverin the example, cD = 2:6 > 2 = m.
Lastly, Figure 6c plots the value of each strategy as a function of the base production cost,
c. In the example, demand is normally distributed with  = 150 and  = 75, and the remaining
parameters are: v = 10, m = 2, cD = 1, cQ = 1, s = 0:5 and  = 1. First observe that the value of
quick response is concave in cat rst increasing, then decreasing. The value is initially increasing
because greater c implies greater inventory overage costs, meaning the rm can benet by moving
to a quick response system which reduces overage. Moreover, quick response always reduces the
chance of a clearance sale, which gives a behavioral benet as well. However, both of these factors
14Of course, it is possible to construct examples in which the value of quick response always dominates the value
of enhanced design, and vice versa. The gure depicts just one possible ordering.
15Although there is an increasing portion for high , this is in fact a region where enhanced design is so costly that
the optimal production quantity is zero. Because prot in the traditional system continues to decrease as a function
of , the incremental value D   T =  T begins to increase.
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are diminished at high c: in this case, the margins are so low that the additional cost of a unit
procured using quick response (c+ cQ) essentially eliminates rm prot, leading to a preference for
traditional production. Furthermore, when costs are high the chance of a clearance sale is already
low in the traditional system, meaning there is limited behavioral benet from quick response at
high c.
The value of enhanced design, on the other hand, is decreasing in c. This, again, is due to the
fact that the behavioral advantages of enhanced design are lower when the production cost is higher
and hence the chance of a clearance sale is already low; moreover, if costs are already high, the
rm may be unwilling to tolerate additional costs resulting from enhanced design. The behavior
of fast fashion as a function of c is, as one would expect, somewhere between the behaviors of
quick response and enhanced design. We observe that this implies fast fashion is most valuable for
low to moderate production cost items.16 This may at rst appear counter-intuitive: fast fashion
production, which minimizes waste and maximizes consumer value, would seemingly appear most
valuable when costs are high and hence waste is expensive and margins low. Hence, the behavioral
consequences of fast fashion that we identify lead to new, surprising e¤ects that run counter to
conventional operational wisdom.
To summarize the results of this section, we have noted that fast fashion is most valuable for low
cost items with high demand variability and low clearance pricesprecisely the scenario observed
in the fashion apparel industry.
8.3 Design-Dependent Clearance Price
In the preceding analytical and numerical results, we assumed that the clearance or salvage price
(s) was independent of the production system used by the rm. In particular, the enhanced design
and fast fashion systems had no greater clearance price than the quick response and traditional
systems, despite the purported enhancements to product design resulting in greater consumer value
in the former two production modes. One might reasonably argue, though, that enhanced design
results in changes to the product that yield an increase in the clearance price proportional to the
increase in consumer value, m. In this section we consider this possibility, modeling the clearance
price in the enhanced design and fast fashion systems as equal to s+m, where  2 [0; 1] represents
16The value of fast fashion need not be decreasing in c; like quick response, the value can be more concave in c.
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the residual fraction of enhanced designs incremental value that carries into the clearance market.
This change complicates the analytical comparisons of the various systems signicantly. The
reason for this is that a higher clearance price, all else being equal, increases the rms optimal
inventory level, thereby increasing the probability of a clearance sale and hence increasing consumer
incentives to delay purchasingthis means the rm must reduce prices to induce consumers to buy
early. At the same time, consumers must pay a higher clearance price and so consumer utility
(conditional on obtaining a unit) is reducedthis, in contrast to the preceding e¤ect, means the
rm can raise prices and still induce early purchasing. Which e¤ect dominates is unclear, and
consequently, the total e¤ect of higher clearance prices on equilibrium full prices and inventory
is not obvious. Moreover, even if higher clearance prices have an unambiguous e¤ect on the
equilibrium full price, the ultimate impact on prot is not clear; if, e.g., the increased availability
e¤ect dominates and full prices are decreasing in , the rms salvage value is increasing in ,
meaning full price revenues are decreasing and clearance revenues are increasing in , with the net
e¤ect unclear. Hence, in this section, we resort to numerical analysis to study this issue.
We rst discuss selected examples similar to our approach §8.2. In these examples, demand is
normal with  = 150 and  = 75. In addition, v = 10, m = 1, c = 3, cD = 0:3, cQ = 1:5, and  = 1.
Figure 7a illustrates the incremental value of each of the alternative production systems (i.e., the
increase in prot over the traditional system) as a function of , the residual value parameter, when
s = 0:3. Note that the value of quick response is independent of , since this system does not
possess enhanced design features. Our rst observation is that the value of enhanced design is
not monotonic in  (though the variation is slight); rather, it is roughly concave, peaking around
 = 0:5. Thus, the two counteracting forces we described above (an increase in  leading to
a simultaneous decrease in the selling price and increase in salvage values) dominate at di¤erent
times: for small , the increase in clearance revenues dominates and leads to greater overall prot,
whereas for large , the decrease in the equilibrium prices dominates and leads to lower prots.
Next, observe that the value of fast fashion is decreasing17 in , and at a faster rate than the
value of enhanced design. This latter feature is characteristic of the examples we have examined.
The greater impact of  on the value of fast fashion appears to be rooted in the fact that the
17We note that the value of fast fashion need not be strictly decreasing in ; as with enhanced design, a more
concave shape is possible.
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Figure 7. An example of the incremental value of the various production systems as a function of  when
s = 0:3 (a) and when s = 1:5 (b).
equilibrium in-stock probability is independent of the full price in the fast fashion system; hence,
increasing  unambiguously increases this term. Greater in-stock probabilities in turn lead to lower
equilibrium prices and prots. On the other hand, in the enhanced design system, the in-stock
probability depends on the price as well as the salvage value; hence, greater salvage values leading
to greater consumer incentive to delay may lead to lower prices, which in turn moderates the impact
on the in-stock probability. The consequence of this result is that the value of fast fashion appears
to be most sensitive to the assumptions on clearance price analyzed in this section; enhanced design
has (relatively) minimal variation as a function of .
In Figure 7a, fast fashion is always optimal, and the complementarity e¤ect holds except at very
high in other words, unless a signicant portion of the value increase m carries into the salvage
period, complementarity holds and fast fashion is optimal. For very high , complementarity
no longer holds because of the severe e¤ect of high clearance prices on the value of fast fashion.
This is representative of the numerical examples we have explored, although we note that the
threshold  above which complementarity ceases to hold can vary substantially; in Figure 7a,
it is approximately 0.95, while in Figure 7b, which is an identical example save for s = 1:5, the
threshold  is approximately 0.5.
To test this logic on a larger scale, we extended the full scale numerical study using the parameter
combinations in Table 3 to allow for  > 0. To ensure nite solutions in all possible combinations,
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we require  < 0:1 (i.e.,  > 0:1 may result in negative overage costs in some instances). Using
 2 f0:05; 0:07; 0:09g, we found that complementarity held in 23,792 out of 24,057 cases, or 98.89%
of the sample, compared to 99.4% of the sample with = 0. We conclude that our primary result,
that quick response and enhanced design are complements, continues to hold with design-dependent
salvage values if  is not too large.
9 Conclusion
With the success of fast fashion retailers, an increasing amount of attentionboth academic and
practicalhas been paid to these innovative rms. In this paper, we present a modeling framework
that allows us to capture and isolate the key aspects that dene a fast fashion system: enhanced
design e¤orts and quick response capabilities. By employing this approach, we analyze four
potential operating systems: traditional systems (with standard design e¤orts and slow production),
quick response systems, enhanced design systems, and fast fashion systems (with both enhanced
design and quick response), and characterize equilibrium inventory levels, prices, and consumer
purchasing behavior in each case.
We focus much of our discussion on the issue of whether quick response and enhanced design
are complements or substitutes. We nd that, while it is possible for the two practices to be
substitutes, it is much more likely that they are complements. The reason is that there are multiple
forces impacting sales and prices which determine complementarity. In the vast majority of our
numerical cases (over 99%), the complementarity factors (signicantly) outweigh the substitution
factors, leading enhanced design and quick response to be overall complements.
This result occurs despite the fact that, as we alluded to earlier, we have ignored a crucial aspect
of how enhanced product design interacts with quick response: namely, that enhanced design may
simply be more e¤ective if production leadtimes are shorter. If, for example, the production
leadtime is six months, then no matter how much e¤ort the rm places on product design, it still
must nalize design well in advance of the selling season, meaning it may miss important trends
and changes in consumer preferences. On the other hand, if the production leadtime is one month,
then design may be nalized much later, allowing the rm to pursue changing trends in a much
more agile and responsive manner. Consequently, the potential value of enhanced designall else
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being equalcan be greater if the rm has achieved quick response.
We nd that, even controlling for the latter complementarity e¤ect (assuming that it is zero), the
two practices are almost always complements. Thus, the complementarity of these two strategies
does not, in general, depend on the fact that production leadtime reduction allows a rm to delay
its design decisions. However, if we were to include this e¤ect in concert with the other forces
we have described, the complementarity of enhanced design and quick response would be even
more dramatic, a fact which leads us to conclude that there is substantial valueoperationally and
behaviorallyfrom adopting a fast fashion approach.
The fact that enhanced design and quick response are complementsand that the magnitude
of complementarity increases as customers become more strategichelps to explain how even seem-
ingly costly systems can be protable. European fast fashion retailers such as Zara, H&M, and
Benetton, for example, employ large sta¤s of in-house designers and even use costly local labor and
expedited shipping methods when necessary. While this seemingly puts these rms at a heavy cost
disadvantage, they manage to reap additional benets by minimizing strategic behavior, more so
even than employing either production strategy by itself.
Naturally, when choosing whether to implement one of the strategies we describe, a rm must
evaluate xed costs in addition to the variable costs and operating prots that we analyze. How-
ever, the fact remains that even when xed costs are accounted for, the value of the fast fashion
system, relative to the alternative systems, generally increases as consumers become more patient
(and hence more strategic in their purchasing behavior), a fact which justies the use of sophisti-
cated production systems capable of enhanced design and quick response in markets characterized
by savvy consumer populations. Crucially, the magnitude of complementarity between the base
strategies of fast fashion systems is greatest if customers are very strategic and the marginal pro-
duction cost impact of enhanced design is small, meaning we would expect to see most fast fashion
implementations in precisely these conditions. This prediction may be empirically testable, which
could present interesting opportunities for future research.
In addition, there are a number of other (non-operational) reasons why a rm might adopt a fast
fashion strategy, including: competitive and marketing issues (e.g., fast fashion as a competitive
distinction), market positioning (to high-end or fashion-conscious consumers), and political or social
concerns (e.g., localized production as an act of social responsibility or public relations by the rm).
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All of these reasons, and doubtless many more, inuence the value of fast fashion. However, as
our model shows, an important consequence of fast fashion product is its impact on consumer
purchasing behavior and the operational e¢ ciency of the rm. While quick response and enhanced
design practices are not suited to every industry or every product, in cases where the strategies are
feasible and not prohibitively expensive, the reward for implementing such systems simultaneously
can be signicant, particularly when consumers are sophisticated.
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A Appendix: Proofs
We introduce the following notation, which we use throughout the analysis: let (x)+ = max(x; 0),
let L (q) = E (N   q)+ be the expected lost sales (excess demand above q) and let I (q) = E (q  N)+
be the expected leftover inventory (excess inventory above N that is cleared at the sale price s).
Proof of Lemma 1. As discussed in the discussion preceding the lemma, the only viable
equilibrium is one in which all consumers attempt to purchase at the full price. Hence, for this
proof (and all remaining proofs) we restrict our attention to that case. The prot function in (??)
is the familiar newsvendor formula yielding an optimal inventory level (given a particular price p)
satisfying F (q) = (p  c) = (p  s). Thus, this equilibrium is viable if consumers have incentive to
purchase early, i.e., if
v   p   (v   s) ; (2)
if the rm chooses the optimal inventory level, F (qT ) = (p  c) = (p  s), and if expectations
of consumers are rational. Rationality of consumer expectations implies that  is the actual
probability that a consumer who unilaterally deviates from the equilibrium (by attempting to
buy during the clearance sale) obtains the productin other words, the probability that a single
consumer who buys late gets the product conditional on all other consumers (from the market
represented by N) buying early. This occurs if and only if the rm has su¢ cient inventory, qT , to
cover the entire market, N . Hence,  = Pr(N  qT ) = F (qT ). When choosing the price p, the
rm maximizes its prot by selecting the highest price that satises (2), which implies the optimal
pricing policy is to set a full price equal to pT = v    (v   s). Combining this expression with
the  = F (qT ) requirement yields
pT = v   
pT   c
pT   s
(v   s) :
Simplifying this expression yields
pT =
A(v)pA(v)2   4B(v; c)
2
:
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The lower candidate equilibrium sale price results in pT < c, and hence is unsupportable; thus, a
unique equilibrium exists which satises the conditions in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the same logic from Lemma 1, the only possible candidate equilibrium
is one in which all consumers attempt to purchase at the full price. Suppose p  c+ cQ. In such
an equilibrium, the rms expected prot with quick response as a function of the initial inventory
procurement (q) and price p is
Q (q; p) = (p  c)  cQL(q)  (c  s)I(q):
This function is concave in q, and the unique optimal inventory level is given by
qQ = F
 1

cQ
c+ cQ   s

:
Note that this quantity is independent of the selling price. Recall that consumers purchase early if
v   p   (v   s) : (3)
If the rm behaves optimally and if consumer expectations are rational, then  = F

qQ

=
cQ= (c+ cQ   s). Hence, the maximum price that induces consumers to purchase prior to the sale
by making (3) hold with equality is given by (1). Alternatively, if p < c+cQ, the rm will never use
the option to procure additional inventory, meaning the prot function and equilibrium analysis
reduce to that analyzed in Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3. By observing the expressions for the equilibrium prices, note that the
price is higher in the Q system than the T system if and only if the probability that a customer
obtains a unit at the sale price () is lower in the Q system. This happens if
cQ
c+ cQ   s <
pT   c
pT   s
:
Rearranging the terms, this reduces to cQ < pT   c.
Proof of Lemma 7. Comparing the equilibrium prices from Lemmas 2 and 6, it is easy to
see that pF > p

Q. Comparing prices from Lemmas 4 and 6, observe that the price in the F system
is greater than the price in the D system if and only if the equilibrium  is lower in the F system,
i.e., if
cQ
c+ cD + cQ   s <
pD   c  cD
pD   s
:
Rearranging the terms, the inequality holds if
(pD   c  cD) (c+ cQ + cD   s)  cQ (pD   s) > 0;
which, in turn, reduces to the condition
(c+ cD   s) (pD   c  cQ   cD) > 0:
Since c + cD   s > 0, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the relationship to hold is pD   c  
cQ   cD > 0. The result that pF > pT then follows from Lemma 5 if pD > c+ cD + cQ holds.
Proof of Theorem 1. Quick response and enhanced design are complements if F   Q 
D   T . Let S (x) =    L(x) be the expected sales given an inventory level of x. Note that
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S(x)   for any x. When cD = 0, the equilibrium prot in each of the four systems is
T = (p

T   c)S(qT )  (c  s) I(qT );
Q =
 
pQ   c

  (cQ)L(qQ)  (c  s) I(qQ);
D = (p

D   c)S(qD)  (c  s) I(qD);
F = (p

F   c)  (cQ)L(qF )  (c  s) I(qF ):
Let 
 (q) be the prot in system 
 2 fT;D; P; Fg at quantity level q. Observe that F   Q =
F (q

F )  Q

qQ

 F

qQ

  Q

qQ

, and hence
F   Q 
 
pF   pQ

+ cQ
 
L(qQ)  L(qQ)

+ (c  s) I(qQ)  (c  s) I(qQ)
=
 
pF   pQ

:
Similarly, D   T = D (qD)  T (qT )  D (qD)  T (qD), which implies
D   T  (pD   pT )S (qD)  (c  s) I(qD) + (c  s) I(qD)
= (pD   pT )S (qD) :
Because S(x)   for any x, it follows that
(pD   pT )  (pD   pT )S (qD)  D   T :
It follows that complementarity holds if pF   pQ  pD   pT , or equivalently if pF   pD  pQ   pT .
Observe that when m = 0, pF   pD = pQ  pT . (That is, if both cD = 0 and m = 0, fast fashion is
equivalent to quick response and enhanced design is equivalent to the traditional system.) Because
pQ and p

T are independent of m, to show p

F   pD  pQ   pT for all m > 0 it is su¢ cient to show
pF  pD is increasing in m. Substituting cD = 0 into the equilibrium price equations from Lemmas
4 and 6, we have
pD =
(v +m) (1  ) + (1 + ) s
2
+
q
((v +m) (1  ) + (1 + ) s)2   4 (s (v +m)  c (v +m  s))
2
;
pF = v +m  
cQ
c+ cQ   s (v +m  s) :
The di¤erence between these expressions is
pF   pD = (v +m  s)
 
1   cQ
c+ cQ   s  
(1  )
2
  1
2
r
1 + 2   2 v +m+ s  2c
v +m  s
!
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to m,
d
dm
(pF   pD) =
 
1   cQ
c+ cQ   s  
(1  )
2
  1
2
r
1 + 2   2 v +m+ s  2c
v +m  s
!
+
(c  s)
(v +m  s)
q
1 + 2   2 v+m+s 2cv+m s
:
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The second term is clearly non-negative; the rst term is non-negative if and only if pF  pD.
From Lemma 5, this occurs if cQ < pD   c. Observing that pD is decreasing in , and substituting
 = 1 into the expression for pD, we see that a su¢ cient condition for cQ < p

D   c is cQ <
s +
p
(v +m  s) (c  s)   c. This implies that if cD = 0 and cQ is su¢ ciently small, pF   pD is
increasing in m. The complementarity result (F   Q  D   T ) follows.
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